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Introduction.
When considering what justice means in a contemporary liberal society, some
notion of freedom often comes to mind. To paraphrase the late Gerald Gaus, our
freedom is normatively basic and the onus of justification always falls on those
who try and coercively limit freedom (Gaus, 2011, p. 17). But in the realm of
politics whereby certain decisions always rule over the free will of others,
freedom can be a rather paradoxical concept. In fact, since the Enlightenment,
Western political philosophy has produced a long lineage of thinkers attempting to
unravel this paradox while rationally preserving the moral value of freedom in
political life. These thinkers belong to an intellectual tradition known as
philosophical liberalism and for many centuries, one of the most prominent
theories regarding the moral legitimacy of political power within that tradition has
been public reason liberalism.1 Public reason liberals argue that freedom is
preserved in political life when certain principles of political power can be
demonstrated as justifiable to all reasonable persons who are subjected to such
power.2 But again, one might wonder what sort of principles guiding the use of
political power could ever achieve such a feat given that persons regularly reach
opposing political conclusions in their reasoning. This is why contentious issues
concerning what is just dominates our political discourse and political power
always fails to secure comprehensive agreement among all rational persons who
are subjected to it. Nevertheless, public reason liberals argue that in being
reasonable, rational persons can converge on common principles of political
power.
So then who are the reasonable and what kind of political power do they
endorse? This article explores the answers to these questions offered by the public
reason tradition and ultimately argues that the answers prove to be untenable.
However, I’ll argue that a neo-Aristotelian framework of political virtue can avoid
these pitfalls while providing a rational framework for political normativity. Of
course, this transition is sure to elicit some serious objections. Firstly, the
neo-Aristotelian account strikes many public reason liberals as unjustifiable.
Secondly, the account seems at odds with democracy. In section I, I will survey
the normative perspective underlying public reason liberalism and its theory of
justice. In section II, I will explore the normative perspective of a neo-Aristotelian
account and its own theory of justice. Then, in section III, I will argue that only
the latter conception of justice is rationally acceptable. Lastly, I’ll conclude by
briefly touching base on the practical implications of what I have argued.
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According to Gaus, “social contract theory was fundamentally and explicitly concerned with
identifying a source of public reason” (Gaus, 1996).
2
Various theorists will expand and contract the scope of “political power” as it concerns justice.
For Rawls, justice applies only to constitutional essentials and the distribution of primary goods
but not any further decisions of the legislature under such an order. See Rawls (2001, p 91). For
other contemporary arguments in favor of public reason liberalism, see Nussbaum (2011) , Gaus
(2011), Quong (2010), Estlund (2008), Nagel (1991), Larmore (1987). Some have extended the
tenets of public reason to moral epistemology itself. Gaus (2011), Darwall (2006), and Scanlon
(1998).

I. The Freestanding Self
Perhaps the most influential articulation of the politically normative framework
known as public reason liberalism comes from John Rawls. Rawls perceived the
problematic contentions of society as marked by the fact that persons come to
possess incompatibly doctrinal conceptions of a good life and thus they inevitably
contend on the distribution of ‘primary goods,’ which is to say the liberties and
economic means necessary to effectuate that life. Rawls referred to this as the fact
of reasonable pluralism. Given this contention, Rawls felt that the chief task of
political philosophy was to delineate political principles governing the
distribution of primary goods that all rational persons can accept. In his seminal
work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempted to derive these political principles
with the construction of a thought experiment now famously known as The Veil
of Ignorance. From behind The Veil, all rational persons are eclipsed from the
many incompatible doctrines - or “burdensome judgments” - that facilitate our
political contentions with one another so that we can freely and fairly choose
principles of justice to govern our society. This experiment exemplified what it
means to be reasonable according to Rawls. When deliberating on the issues of
distributive justice, the reasonable are “mutually disinterested” persons who
dismiss any burdensome political judgments in order to locate political judgments
that all rational persons can assent to (Rawls, 1999 [1971], pp. 6-7, 58 – 59,
81-82).
Due to the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls believed that no society
could reach or maintain any actual consensus concerning just political power and
so our natural freedom would never be preserved in politics. Nonetheless, Rawls
demonstrated that a kind of political freedom is preserved by advancing mutually
disinterested principles that all freestanding rational persons can still accept in
abstraction from the various incompatible doctrines that facilitate our contentions
to begin with. Such a consensus is what Rawls would later refer to as an
“overlapping consensus” (Rawls, 2005, p. 26). For Rawls, rational disagreement
in the realm of everyday political discourse posed no threat to the overlapping
consensus that reasonable persons uphold. For our purposes, we can think of this
general argument as the Public Reason Argument for Justice (PRAJ), which goes
as follows:
(1) All rational persons have sufficient reason to be mutually disinterested
(i.e. reasonable).
(2) All mutually disinterested persons have sufficient reason to endorse a
certain form of political power.
(3) If all rational persons have sufficient reason to be mutually
disinterested, and all mutually disinterested persons have sufficient reason
to endorse a certain form of political power, then all rational persons have
sufficient reason to endorse a certain form of political power.
(4) Therefore, all rational persons have sufficient reason to endorse a
certain form of political power.

So what exactly are these certain forms of political power that all rational persons
have sufficient reason to endorse? Ultimately, Rawls delineated what he argued
were the two principles of political power concerning the distribution of primary
goods in this respect. The most controversial of these principles departed from
classically liberal conceptions of economic justice and included a maximin
scheme of state redistribution that ensured the greatest possible gains for the
comparatively least well off. This “new liberal” take on economic justice was part
of a principle that Rawls called the “difference principle.” 3 Many rational persons
in liberal societies endorse the difference principle, but many rational persons in
liberal societies reject its highly redistributive powers in favor of the free market
justice advocated by classical liberals. This contention is not unfamiliar in debates
concerning economic justice today. However, let’s recall that mere disagreement
alone does not challenge the public reason liberal. The point is to locate
principles that preserve our political freedom by appealing to an overlapping
consensus. In fact, this is precisely why Rawls rejected classical liberalism. Rawls
believed that the free market conception of justice championed by classical
liberals was unreasonable because it was not predicated on mutually disinterested
reasoning but rather burdensome judgments concerning the moral supremacy of
private property, and a doctrinal perception of persons as comprising a competing
network of private associations. On Rawls’s account, classical liberalism could
never maintain a publicly acceptable notion of justice because it fails to respect
persons as freestanding individuals whose interests always stand prior to the
doctrinal preferences of classical liberalism (Rawls, 2005 pp. 11, 264 - 65).
Although Rawls remained committed to the PRAJ, he would eventually
begin to question how the principles he’d prescribed could be the practically
feasible principles of any social order given that there was no guarantee that
rational persons in a pluralistic society would come to see that they have reason to
uphold mutually disinterested political principles over whatever principles might
be entailed by the various doctrines that often guide us in our everyday lives (ibid,
p. 18). In effect, Rawls had acknowledged that premise 1 of the PRAJ could not
be accepted as true in the absence of certain antecedent conditions. Thus, Rawls
conceded that nothing of his theory had established that the principles of justice
could be those of both a just and stable society. However, in Political Liberalism,
Rawls argued that his principles of justice could be stably upheld from within a
politically liberal ethos and its cultural perception of the self. According to Rawls,
political persons in liberal societies generally have, above all else, a freestanding
conception of the self as well as others in the public sphere as “self-authenticating
3

See Rawls (2001, p. 42). Maximin redistributions will permit economic inequalities over more
equitable redistributions if such distributions would ultimately decrease the economic standing of
the least well off under liberal market conditions. Because of this, not all egalitarians agree with
Rawls. For example, socialists like G.A. Cohen have pointed out that the difference principle
makes economic justice dependent upon the interests of the property-owning classes who
otherwise have the capacity to threaten the economic standing of the least well-off in response to
redistributive taxation under liberal market conditions, thus making greater economic equality
appear unjustified by the standards of the difference principle. According to Cohen, no economic
principle permitting such an imbalance of power could be a principle of justice. See Cohen (2008).

sources of valid claims”(ibid, pp. 26, 169). Therefore, liberal cultures are
generally disposed to accept a “duty of civility” to actually uphold the mutually
disinterested principles of political power that all freestanding rational persons
can accept over the various doctrines that otherwise guide so many of us in our
everyday lives.4
Moving onto the next section, we’ll consider an alternative tradition of
political normativity. Such a tradition departs from public reason liberalism’s
commitment to the mutually disinterested judgments of freestanding rational
persons and moves towards what can be called the virtuous judgments of
responsible rational persons.

II. Virtue and Responsibility
When it comes to political normativity, Aristotle may have left us with an
important insight:
“The city does not exist for the sake of an alliance…nor for
exchange and [commercial] dealings…whoever is concerned about
good government keeps an eye on political virtue and vice. It is
therefore evident that virtue ought to be a care for every city that is
truly…called a city. Otherwise, the city becomes an alliance…and
law becomes a treaty...not that which makes the citizens good and
just” (Aristotle, 1280a34-b12).
The suggestion here is that a legitimate political society will be one where persons
flourish in the cultivation of virtuous ideals and the just political institutions that
serve those ideals. But more must be said about virtues and human flourishing.
Drawing from the MacIntyrian account of virtue, I’ll present a neo-Aristotelian
account of political virtue.
On the neo-Aristotelian account of political normativity, there are two
dimensions of human value: The external goods of distribution and the internal
goods of human virtue (MacIntyre, 1993[1981]). The external goods of
distribution (e.g. wealth, power, opportunities, etc.) are akin to what Rawls called
“primary goods’ and include any good that is external to the agent. We might
think of external goods in the sense that any external good that I have is one that
you don’t have. On the other hand, the internal goods of human virtue are internal
to human practices. Such goods are an acquired human quality, the possession and
4

This is also called the internal conception of public reason liberalism. For contemporary
advocates, see Estlund (2008) and Quong (2010). However, it should be noted that this assumption
that politically liberal persons have reason to endorse public reason liberalism in virtue of what it
means to be liberal, is controversial. Liberal perfectionists, for example, reject the tenets of public
reason while maintaining their own commitment to liberal values. For a prominent defense of
liberal perfectionism, see Raz (1986).

exercise of which are of a cumulative value benefiting all who share in its
collective developments (ibid, p. 232). So to further understand what a virtue is
we must look to the concept of a practice as stipulated within the neo-Aristotelian
tradition. According to MacIntyre, a practice constitutes: an ongoing context
present within human life whereby certain goals and themes of conflict present
themselves, and whereby virtues can and have been realized, refined, and
extended over time through a continued recognition of, and engagement with, its
practical and relational structures. It’s from the standpoint of one’s engagement
with a practice that rational persons can begin to recognize certain virtuous ends,
which is to say: any feasible human pursuit, the cultivation of which rationally
serves to overcome and improve upon the challenges of the practical and
relational structures in which they are situated while remaining internally
consistent with other similarly situated virtues. Correspondingly, whatever ends
fail to characterize these features while perpetuating the practical and relational
challenges of the practice, are understood as vices. Therefore, virtues are
constitutive of any successful – i.e. flourishing - practice (ibid.)
Given this framework, recognizing political virtue requires one to
acknowledge their own engagement with (i.e. responsibility to) the practical and
relational structures of politics as a practice. Since a practice constitutes an
ongoing context present within human life whereby certain goals and themes of
conflict present themselves within its practical and relational structures, political
life arguably embodies a certain practice. Political life is that ongoing context
whereby one must attempt to communicate and/or uphold amidst contention,
principles that are justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold them. In
other words, the practice of politics is essentially communal reasoning and this
kind of activity is of course prior to any governing institutions. Furthermore, it’s
important to recognize that politics is the most basic of social practices because it
is inherent to all communities, as all communities have the capacity to reason with
one another concerning community issues. Upon the recognition of politics as a
practice, recognizing political virtue means calling into question those
characteristic pursuits that rationally serve to overcome and improve upon the
challenges of the [political] practical and relational structures in which they are
situated while remaining internally consistent with other similarly situated
virtues.
Given the practical and relational structure of the political practice, the
neo-Aristotelian tradition is able to derive at least three virtues of political life:
The political virtue of honesty as derived through experience with what it means
to successfully engage in any attempt to communicate and/or uphold amidst
contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold
them. Furthermore, the political virtue of courage as derived through experience
with what it means to successfully engage in any attempt to communicate and/or
uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational persons who
must uphold them. Lastly, the virtue of justice as derived through experience with
what it means to successfully engage in any attempt to communicate and/or
uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational persons
who must uphold them. In summary, flourishing political societies require rational

persons to be honest, courageous, and just if they are to successfully attempt to
communicate and/or uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all
rational persons who must uphold them. Public reason liberals needn’t find this
general perspective to be that contentious. However, notice that on a
neo-Aristotelian account, the normativity of justice is conceived somewhat
differently than for public reason liberals. This is because neo-Aristotelians hold
that one can only successfully engage in any attempt to communicate and/or
uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational persons who
must uphold them, in the event that all rational persons in question are responsible
to the relevant practices in question.
In closing this section we now have two competing conceptions of justice:
(1) the public reason conception of justice as issuing mutually disinterested
principles that all freestanding rational persons can accept and (2) the
neo-Aristotelian conception of justice as issuing virtuous principles that all
responsibly rational persons can accept. As we continue, I’ll argue that the first
conception is not successfully pursuant of any principles that are justifiable to all
rational persons who must uphold them. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of
public reason liberalism, the essence of justice is to resist the allegedly
“burdensome” moral judgments of virtue in political life. This objection will need
to be overcome in order to proceed with the argument.

III. Freedom or Responsibility?
Any declaration concerning what persons ought to do in the event that such
persons do not already wish to do so is undoubtedly controversial. In fact, the
burdensome character of politically telling persons what they ought to do is what
motivates the search for public reason. For the public reason liberal, it’s the fact
that we have so many varying social circumstances and conceptions of the moral
good that we’re incapable of true freedom in the form of normative principles that
we all can accept. This is why any virtue theoretic approach like that of the
neo-Aristotelian tradition generally strikes public reason liberals as unjustifiable.
Nevertheless, the tendency to reject the virtue theoretic approach as unjustifiable
comes predominantly from one of two misconceptions. The first misconception
concerns the hierarchical and rather unscientific conception of teleological virtues
found in the classical Aristotelian tradition. On the classical Aristotelian account,
virtuous character was something available only to persons who were naturally
inclined towards that purpose. Such a conception understandably lends itself to
the contemporary notion that virtues are elitist. The second misconception
concerns the Enlightenment conception of virtues found most readily in the work
of David Hume. On Hume’s account, virtues were thought to be those qualities of
human character that arouse in others the “pleasing sentiments of approbation”
(Hume, 1998[1751], I.10). Such a conception understandably lends itself to the
contemporary notion that virtues are non-rational, and hence the importance of

moral neutrality for the liberal tradition.5 Consequently, neither account was
capable of explaining how it could be rational to say that any particular person
ought to be virtuous. But none of this means that the prescriptive claims of virtue
are rationally unjustifiable; it simply means that they are rationally unjustifiable if
we assume that they are terms used simply for denoting naturally superior humans
or an affectively pleasing character.
The neo-Aristotelian tradition allows for a rationally justifiable
understanding of virtues. This is because wherever rational persons are engaged
with (i.e. responsible to) any ongoing context present within human life whereby
certain goals and themes of conflict present themselves…through the continued
recognition of its practical and/or relational structures, then it’s rational to say
that such persons ought to pursue what proves to be a feasible human pursuit, the
cultivation of which rationally serves to overcome and improve upon the
challenges of the practical and/or relational structures in which they are situated
while remaining internally consistent with other similarly situated virtues. For
example, an educational practice consists of such virtues as patience,
attentiveness, and studiousness (among others). Now one may not be able to
rationally derive the arbitrary conclusion that they ought to be patient from the
simple fact that they are a rational person. However, from the fact that they are a
rational person engaged with (i.e. responsible to) the practice of education, it can
be rationally derived that they ought to succeed at doing what an educator does.
Depending on the circumstances this might entail, among other things, patience,
attentiveness, and studiousness. But notice that educational virtues do not depend
on what an educational institution mandates, or whether virtues of education are
emotionally agreeable, or whether the natural purpose of such a person is to be an
educator. Instead, they depend on whether they serve to rationally overcome and
improve upon the challenges presented by the practical and relational structures of
education; challenges to which the virtuous practitioner perceives themselves
responsible. Therefore, persons who are rationally responsible to education judge
various preferences, affective approbations, and institutional mandates in
accordance with virtue so that they can succeed in realizing the internal goods of
the practice. To do otherwise suggests that one is either being irrational or does
not see oneself as responsible to the practice of education.
Although public reason liberals generally reject the neo-Aristotelian
tradition, they must adopt its framework in their own theory of justice. This is
because to say that one ought to uphold the mutually disinterested principles that
all freestanding rational persons can accept can only be rationalized in the event
that one also perceives themselves as responsible to an attempt to communicate
and/or uphold amidst contention, principles that are justifiable to all rational
persons who must uphold them. We might also think of it this way. If any persons
in question were not political persons but were rationally self-interested persons
5

Many have argued that such a principle of neutrality is central to liberalism. See Rawls (2005,
pp. 56-57). Larmore (1987), Dworkin (1985), Ackerman (1980). See Simmons (2005) for a
libertarian endorsement of the principle. Even J.S. Mill, a utilitarian, seemed to embrace the notion
in his categorical rejection of legal moralism. See Mill (1859, Ch 1).

who, rather than engage themselves responsibly as political citizens, seek to
overcome practical and relational contentions with actions that suppose no
justifiability whatsoever but merely the effectuation of their immediate interests,
then such a person could not possibly rationalize any obligation to justice.
One might object and say that invoking the practice of politics is
irrelevant. Of course public reason justice isn’t justified to self-interested persons.
The point of public reason justice is that it is justified to the freestanding rational
perspective that everyone - even rationally self-interested persons – possesses at
some level. However, this reply would be unsuccessful because all that can be
said of the freestanding rational person from the public reason perspective is that,
amidst contentions, persons attempt to rationally effectuate their ends and that
such ends will require the use of external goods. But to assume that one is
committed to doing this in a justifiable (i.e. political) fashion, rather than the
apolitical nature of rational self-interest, is to move beyond the freestanding
perspective of rational persons and to encumber them with certain tendencies
towards resolving contention; tendencies that are not intrinsic to freestanding
rational humanity but developed through experience. No political principle could
be rationally justifiable to all freestanding rational persons merely in this sense
because freestanding rational persons, in being freestanding, have no
responsibilities to the practice of politics.
In securing the neo-Aristotelian framework, we can establish that claims
of justice are justifiable to any rational persons in question if and only if (1) the
rational persons in question are responsible to the practice of politics, and (2)
what norms are being prescribed are successfully justifiable to all rational persons
who must uphold them. The rational sensibility of such a framework is arguably
why Rawls recast his theory of justice in Political Liberalism. If the principles he
put forward were to be that of a just and stable social order, they had to be
predicated on certain developments allowing persons to even rationalize the
pursuit of justice to begin with. Rawls placed confidence in that achievement
through the developments of a politically liberal culture where rational persons
are said to perceive themselves as responsibly political yet otherwise freestanding
rational persons. Thus in coming to recognize the antecedent conditions of a
politically responsible community to which justice is prescribed, public reason
liberals meet condition one. However, if the principles themselves are to meet
condition two, then the principles must be virtuous principles from the standpoint
of rational persons who are further responsible to whatever practice the norms in
question apply. In other words, it must be a feasible human pursuit, the cultivation
of which rationally serves to overcome and improve upon the challenges of the
practical and relational structures in which it is situated while remaining
internally consistent with other similarly situated virtues. It’s in meeting this
condition that public reason liberalism fails to deliver because although it
recognizes persons as politically responsible, it still presumes that they are to be
otherwise freestanding with regards to whatever practice in which one has
become political. Moving forward we’ll consider a particular domain, or practice,
in which these shortcomings of public reason liberalism prove to be problematic economic life. On this particular issue, the public reason liberal’s disposition

allows for no further rational normativity because just as rational persons must be
responsibly political persons (in pursuit of political virtue) in order to rationalize
the norms of political life, rational persons must be responsibly political and
economic persons (in pursuit of politically economic virtue) in order to rationalize
the norms of a politically economic life.
Near the end of section I, I alluded to liberal society’s inability to
rationalize to one another the norms of economic justice given the incompatible
ends of new liberalism and classical liberalism. However, Rawls diagnosed this
particular problem, not as a failure of public reason’s conception of justice, but
rather the burdensome moralizations of unreasonable persons - i.e. classical
liberals - when attempting to recognize justice. In other words, classical
liberalism’s arbitrary attempt to characterize political persons as fundamentally
private consumers complicates our understanding of principles that are justifiable
to all rational persons who must uphold them. Although this criticism may have
challenged Nozickian or Randian-style libertarians, the critique does not
undermine the claims of prominent public reason liberals like John Tomasi. Such
theorists ground their classically liberal conceptions of economic justice on
mutually disinterested principles that all freestanding rational persons can
allegedly accept.6 Unfortunately, however, two public reason liberals attempting
to advance rationally inconsistent principles of justice cannot be said to
successfully communicate and/or uphold amidst contention, principles that are
justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold them. Therefore, public reason
liberals have failed to advance the principles of economic justice.
Of course, staunch defenders of either Rawlsian or classically liberal
justice within the public reason tradition will reject this conclusion. From the
standpoint of public reason, someone is still being unreasonable by issuing
political principles predicated on “burdensome” doctrines concerning socially
situated conditions (such as a practice), or moral conceptions of the good (such as
virtues) rather than a political yet otherwise freestanding rational perspective from
which we all can agree. But let’s look more closely at this political yet otherwise
freestanding rational perspective that all rational political persons can supposedly
use to derive the same principles of economic governance. Such a person is of the
judgment that one must have, amidst economic contention, certain political
principles of economic governance in order to politically and economically
effectuate their conception of a good life. This judgment is political yet otherwise
rationally freestanding because all rational political persons would still possess
such a judgment in abstraction from the otherwise incompatible doctrines that
guide their economically contentious lives. But as we continue, it turns out that
this judgment concerning the politically economic effectuation of any good life is
complicated further by reducing to competing questions of acquisition and
possession.

6

For public reason arguments against new liberalism and in favor of classical liberalism, see
Tomasi (2012, pp. 241-243), Gaus (2011, p. 514).

Rawlsians argue that their political principles of economic governance are
the reasonable ones because when rational persons abstract themselves from the
various incompatible doctrines that guide their economically contentious lives, it
becomes clear that all rational persons would accept the difference principle and
its maximin redistributions of economic wealth as just. But this can only be true if
we assume that politically protected acquisition is the only political yet otherwise
freestanding means by which one economically effectuates their conception of the
good life. After all, Rawlsian justice will always discriminate against certain
political yet otherwise freestanding rational persons seeking political protection of
the possessions by which they economically effectuate their conception of the
good life. Rawlsians may attempt to reject appeals to possession as unreasonable,
but this cannot succeed because possession is not an economically doctrinal
concept like private property. All political yet otherwise freestanding rational
persons can accept the basic proposition that in order to effectuate one’s
conception of the good life, one must have the possessions needed to
economically effectuate that conception of a good life. As a result, reasonable
persons can still recognize that Rawlsian justice will produce a continuous class
of freestanding possessors who will perceive themselves as unjustifiably
subordinated under such a social order.
However, the same problem confronts public reason liberals in the
classical sense. They argue that if persons abstract themselves from the various
incompatible doctrines that guide their economically contentious lives, it becomes
clear that all rational persons would accept extensive private property rights along
with the efficiently generated wealth of politically liberated markets as just. 7 But
this can only be true if we assume that politically protected possession is the only
political yet otherwise freestanding means by which one economically effectuates
their conception of the good life. After all, classically liberal justice will always
discriminate against certain political yet otherwise freestanding rational persons
seeking political acquisition in order to economically effectuate their conception
of the good life. Classical liberals may attempt to reject appeals to acquisition as
unreasonable, but this cannot succeed because acquisition is not an economically
doctrinal concept. All political yet otherwise freestanding rational persons can
accept the basic proposition that in order to effectuate one’s conception of the
good life, one must have the acquisitions needed to economically effectuate that
conception of a good life. As a result, reasonable persons still recognize that
classically liberal justice will produce a continuous class of freestanding
acquisitors who will perceive themselves as unjustifiably subordinated under such
a social order.
Politically protected possession and acquisition are not doctrinal
considerations of economic life but rather practical and relational structures that
can be rationally deduced from any economic effectuation of a good life. In other
words, any economic effectuation of a good life will necessarily entail some
7

Some classical liberals even argue for small levels of social assistance. See Tomasi (2012).
However, they reject the maximin scheme of redistribution that new liberals endorse, as well as
egalitarian economic justice in general.

interpersonal dimension of acquisition and possession. Therefore, no political yet
otherwise freestanding rational person could dismiss the practical and relational
reality of either acquisition or possession within any economic life while still
remaining rational. If the production, distribution, and political management of
economic goods were not practically and relationally situated but rather an
entirely separate function from the body politic capable of producing economic
goods while both providing for the acquisition of such goods as well as protecting
private possessions, perhaps the institutions of this somewhat miraculous
conception of a political and economic reality would be justified to all
freestanding rational persons. Of course, public reason liberals do not actually
have such a cartoonish notion of society, nor would its institutions need to be
predicated on Rawlsian or classically liberal justifications. Nonetheless, only such
a freestanding manifestation of society could be justified to all freestanding
rational persons. Thus public reason liberals face a dilemma. If public reason
justice requires reasonable persons to deny the place of possession and acquisition
in economic life as doctrinal, then it cannot offer a practically feasible pursuit, the
cultivation of which rationally serves to overcome and improve upon the
challenges of the practical and relational structures in which it is situated. But if
they permit this understanding, their principles will not be internally consistent.
Therefore, the issuing of mutually disinterested principles that all freestanding
rational persons can accept cannot be justifiable to all rational persons, and is thus
not the virtue of justice.
One might try and argue here that the public reason principles of economic
justice are those that impose upon acquisitive and possessive interests the least
and that this is the operative concern when discerning principles from the
standpoint of reasonable persons. This would acknowledge the place of
possession and acquisition in economic life, but notice that applying this line of
reasoning would not give equal respect to possessive and acquisitive persons as
they are but rather it would attempt to aggregate them into categories of least
imposing and non-least imposing while institutionally respecting only those
persons who fall into the former camp at any given time. Therefore, this approach
would not only fail to be just in creating an unjustifiable class of subjugated
rational persons with regard to economic life, it isn’t even public reason
liberalism. Conversely, it’s economic utilitarianism – a position that public reason
liberals already reject for these reasons.
As this argument has shown, the freestanding perspective championed by
public reason liberals is precisely what eviscerates us of rational normativity to
begin with, while once again perpetuating the very structures of unjustifiable
subordination that we wish to escape in political life. In economic life, the
freestanding rational person is devoid of the practical and relational structures of
possessive and acquisitive tendencies - tendencies that could otherwise be
tempered by the virtues of responsible persons with any understanding of a
politically economic community. Fortunately, however, this void isn’t exactly
hopeless. Persons arguably have a continued recognition of the practical and
relational challenges of possession and acquisition that comprise the ongoing
context of a politically economic practice. Such practical and relational challenges

have been recognized with regard to something of vicious possession in the (e.g.
greedy) possessors who politically neglect persons who are unwillingly destitute
and vulnerable, economically speaking. Similarly, there is something of vicious
acquisition recognized in the (e.g. exploitative) acquisitors who attempt to
politically exploit one another’s economic contributions with no intention of
making any contributions of equal value in return. Virtues and vices reveal
themselves to rational persons who responsibly recognize a politically economic
community, and thus political reasoning on these matters beyond the standpoint of
freestanding persons speaks to feasible human pursuits, the cultivation of which
rationally serve to overcome and improve upon the challenges of the practical and
relational structures of an economic life. Furthermore, such virtues are internally
consistent when guiding institutional design within the community, and are thus
justifiable to all politically and economically responsible persons who must
uphold them. This is because configurations of political power concerning both
property and redistribution can be justifiable to all rationally responsible
possessors and acquisitors alike.8
But what if virtues are fundamentally illusory to begin with? After all, I’ve
conceded that the attempt to justify political norms in and of itself cannot be made
rational from the standpoint of rational self-interest. For such persons, the
justifiability of one’s actions is of simply no concern and so if humanity amounts
to nothing more than this will to power, what is to rationally keep us from
navigating our lives as so? Such a nihilistic position undermines political
normativity of any kind. But I suspect that this is not a fact of human nature so
much as a despondent reply to the rational failures of previous political traditions.
Fortunately, nihilism cannot succeed as a critique of the neo-Aristotelian tradition
because such a tradition allows for rational persons to transcend the paradoxical
implications of preceding political traditions. There will always be unjustifiable
subordination in the pursuit of political freedom or utility given the practical and
relational reality of any social order, but this is not inevitable to the politically
responsible pursuit of virtue. Recall an educational community and its virtues. For
those who have committed themselves to a recognition of the practical and
relational structures of an educational practice, internal goods - albeit demanding are no longer deemed oppressive but rather an opportunity to cultivate feasible
human pursuits, the cultivation of which rationally serves to overcome and
improve upon the challenges of the practical and relational structures of
education. The only means by which the cultivation of these internal goods
becomes an oppressive proposition to the educator is in the event that they find
themselves more concerned with external goods or mere self-interest. This is
something gravely misunderstood in political life by utilitarians, public reason
liberals, and their nihilistic successors. Under these circumstances, the responsible
8

This is somewhat akin to the Aristotelian conception of justice as “treating equals equally” since
its conception of justice shows equal regard for the ends of virtue, but not freestanding ends that
are unequal in the eyes of virtue. See Aristotle (1130b-1132b). As neo-Aristotelians note, however,
Aristotle’s own elitist philosophy falsely assumed that certain humans were naturally inclined
towards virtue, and thus his conception morally expected subservience to such persons.

choice would be to resign from education, while the responsible choice for the
latter would be to resign from government.
Although a nihilistic response to the rational failures of public reason
liberalism is not irrational, one can still question the value of dismissing any
attempt to communicate and/or uphold amidst contention, principles that are
justifiable to all rational persons who must uphold them. Afterall, such a person
lives either in continuous exile or proceeds politically with no more regard for
courage, honesty, and justice than the cowardly, deceptive, and imperious
tendencies of a tyrant. The immense existential challenge of either exile or
indifference suggests that such a life is not only more demanding than justice but
a far less viable path to human flourishing. Therefore, one might fare better in
first trying to recognize the unresolved practical and relational conditions that
have compelled them towards exile or indifference to begin with. The
neo-Aristotelian tradition allows one to recognize these unresolved contentions
while positing rational resolutions in response.
This leads us to our last criticism. Why should the neo-Aristotelian
tradition justify the institutional structure of a democratic political society? After
all, the virtue theoretic tradition can invoke antiquated notions of political life that
once advocated subservience to authoritarian governance. But once again, the
misconceptions surrounding these conservative applications of virtue should only
be attributed to classical Aristotelian thought.9 Principles of subservience in
political life fail to be virtuous because politically responsible rational persons
recognize that if anything is to be a justifiable principle, then its authority must be
rationally grounded in something other than the persons who issue those
principles because such persons are fallible. Thus, if persons are fallible in the
issuance of political principles, then politically responsible rational persons know
that there is never any reason to be subservient to them. Hence the virtuous
principle of mutual accountability that guides the institutional design of
democratic governance is also pursuant of justice as issuing virtuous principles
that all politically responsible rational persons can accept.

Conclusion.
Public reason liberals continue to reject the neo-Aristotelian tradition of political
normativity as unreasonable because they claim that the concept of virtue is
inevitably unjustifiable to others. But as I’ve argued, not only is this criticism
predicated on a misconception of virtue theory, no politically normative principle
is capable of achieving rational justification from outside the neo-Aristotelian
9

In fact, this kind of elitism was not only prevalent in classical Aristotelian thought, but also the
proto-liberal work of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, who was no fan of Aristotle, attempted to issue a
political – i.e. allegedly justifiable – argument in favor of subservience to an absolutist state. See
Hobbes (2010, pp. 106 – 112).

tradition of political normativity. This void is precisely why the public reason
tradition itself continues to fracture into the oppositional camps of Rawlsianism
and classical liberalism whereby allegedly “reasonable” persons still perceive one
another as unreasonable in economic life. Therefore, the purpose of this argument
has been to show that public reason liberalism has no good argument in rejecting
the democratic voices of those who are politically guided by what virtues have
been discerned through knowledgeable experience with the underlying practical
and relational structures that our institutional powers come to govern.
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